How does Financial Reporting Quality Relate to Stock Price Crash Risk? Evidence from Indonesian Listed Companies by Butar Butar, Sansaloni & Murniati, Monika Palupi




How does Financial Reporting Quality Relate to Stock Price Crash Risk? 
Evidence from Indonesian Listed Companies 
 
Sansaloni Butar Butar*1, Monika Palupi Murniati2 
1,2 Universitas Katolik Soegijapranata, Semarang, Indonesia 
*Corresponding author: sansaloni@unika.ac.id 
 
 
1. Introduction  
A body of literature on financial reporting 
quality has employed different measures to assess a 
firm’s economic reality. These measures include 
persistence, accruals, smoothness, timeliness, loss 
avoidance, investor responsiveness, and financial 
restatements (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010). 
However, no single measure can perfectly capture 
the true economic of firms over periods. Dechow et 
al., (2010) suggest that earnings quality has to be 
seen in the context of decision making and largely 
depends on the firm’s fundamental performance. 
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This study examines the influence of financial statement transparency, institutional 
investor stability, audit tenure, and conservatism on stock price crash risk. Using firms 
listed on the Indonesia stock exchange from 2011 to 2015 as research samples, 748 
firm-year observations are available for data analysis and hypotheses tests. Employing 
multiple regressions analysis, the results show that institutional investor stability, audit 
tenure, and conservatism have a significant effect on stock price crash risk. However, 
a positive association between audit tenure and stock price crash risk is not supported 
in this study. Meanwhile, the transparency of financial statements has no significant 
effect on stock price crash risk. It may indicate that Indonesian investors tend to 
overlook the issues of financial report transparency while making equity investment 
decisions.  
 
Bagaimana hubungan antara kualitas laporan keuangan dengan Risiko 




Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh transparansi laporan keuangan, stabilitas investor 
institusional, masa jabatan audit, dan konservatisme terhadap risiko crash harga 
saham. Dengan menggunakan perusahaan yang terdaftar di bursa efek Indonesia 
(dari 2011 hingga 2015 sebagai sampel penelitian, 748 pengamatan tahun-
perusahaan dianalisis untuk menentukan hipotesis yang diterima. Metode analisis 
regresi berganda digunakan untuk menganalisis data penelitian. Hasil penelitian 
menunjukan bahwa stabilitas investor institusional, masa jabatan audit, dan 
konservatisme memiliki efek yang signifikan pada risiko crash harga saham. Namun, 
hubungan positif antara masa jabatan audit dan risiko crash harga saham tidak 
ditemukan dalam penelitian ini. Sementara itu, transparansi laporan keuangan tidak 
berpengaruh signifikan terhadap risiko crash harga saham yang menunjukkan bahwa 
investor Indonesia cenderung mengabaikan isu transparansi laporan keuangan dalam 
mengambil keputusan investasi modalnya.  
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As such, researchers continually introduce new 
measures of financial reporting qualities. One 
related measure that has drawn many interests of 
academics was the R2 obtained from modified 
index-model regression which captures the extent 
to which firm-specific information is impounded in 
stock price (Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2000). It has 
been argued that the firms with greater transparency 
should have lower R2. Jin & Myers (2006) 
extended the line of research by focusing on the 
second or higher moments of stock returns. They 
show that opaque stocks with higher R2s are more 
likely to crash. These results have triggered 
considerable interest in the association between 
opacity and stock price crash risks (Hutton, Marcus, 
& Tehranian, 2009).  
Although the incidence of stock price crashes 
have been increasingly common, the question of 
why the market failed to anticipate still remains. A 
widely accepted argument in accounting literature 
is based on the idea of withholding bad news from 
the markets. The argument, commonly referred to 
bad news hoarding argument, says that managers 
tend to hide or withhold bad news disclosure from 
the market knowledge to avoid negative impact on 
their careers and short-term compensation (Kim, 
Li, & Zhang, 2011; Kothari, Wasley, & Wysocki, 
2009). A survey in Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal 
(2005) shows that managers tend to delay bad news 
announcement to avoid unexpected negative 
reaction. However, bad news concealment cannot 
last for a long period of time. When the 
accumulation of bad news passes a certain 
threshold, managers are forced to reveal it at once. 
A sudden revelation of bad news triggers stock 
price crashes and causes asymmetrical distribution 
of stock returns (Hutton et al., 2009). 
Institutional ownership structure may 
determine a firm course of operation and financial 
decision. A large body of research has examined the 
role of institutional investors in safeguarding firm 
resources. Shleifer & Vishny (1997) state that 
investors with large ownership in a firm’s equity 
are more enthusiastic about how managers run the 
company relative to small stockholders. This stems 
from the fact that the welfare of investors with large 
ownership are very much affected by firm stock 
performance. Large investors are willing to spend 
more time and effort in evaluating investment and 
operating policies of a particular company to ensure 
that managers apply sound business policies. If 
deemed necessary, they can use voting rights to 
force managers to work harder for the best interest 
of stockholders. In addition, intense monitoring by 
large stockholders will suppress dysfunctional 
behavior and help align goal congruence. A lack of 
control encourages managers to exploit firm 
resources and manage to hide the negative 
consequences of their action from reported 
financial statements. In effect, financial statements 
are no longer able to reflect the economic reality of 
firms and lose their ability to affect investment 
decision-making. In turn, the unreliable financial 
statement increases the incidence of stock price 
crashes.                
The role of the auditors in ensuring the 
integrity of financial statements has received 
considerable support from analytical and empirical 
studies. Callen & Fang (2017) argue that long audit 
tenure threatens auditor independence and reduces 
manager motivation to reveal bad news. It follows 
that lack of motivation and independency to 
uncover potential fraud and bad business practices 
lower the quality of audited financial statements, 
leading to stock price crashes. On the other hand, 
long audit engagement enables auditors to identify 
potential misstatements and apply proper audit 
procedures to uncover the material misstatement 
(Beck & Wu, 2006). In this sense, longer audit 
tenure may lower the likelihood of stock price 
crashes. Given the two conflicting arguments, it is 
difficult to assess the effect of audit tenure on stock 
price crashes.  
Conservative financial reporting practices are 
expected to reduce the opportunistic behavior of 
managers and improve the reliability of financial 
statements. Applying conservative accounting 
requires companies to recognize bad news faster 
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than good news, forcing managers to reveal bad 
news immediately. However, Kothari et al., (2009) 
provide empirical evidence showing that managers 
tend to release negative information more slowly 
than good news. A managerial tendency to hide bad 
news from investors adversely affects financial 
statements quality, and in turn, triggers stock price 
crashes.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the 
effect of financial reports transparency, 
institutional investor stability, audit tenure, and 
accounting conservatism on stock price crash. The 
underlying motivation is that the phenomena of 
sharp stock price declines in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange, which are increasingly common, 
provide better research setting to study stock price 
crash risk relative to prior studies (Andreou, 
Antoniou, Horton, & Louca, 2016; Callen & Fang, 
2013, 2017; J. B. Kim & Zhang, 2016). During 
2013, stock prices of PT Sepatu Bata Tbk., PT 
Sumber Alfaria Trijaya Tbk. and PT Nipress Tbk. 
plummeted down to 98.2%, 91.2%, and 91% 
respectively (Kusuma, 2013). In 2015, stock prices 
of PT Golden Eagle Energy Tbk., PT Express 
Trasindo Utama Tbk. and PT Bumi Resources 
Minerals plunged as much as 91.03%, 90.85%, and 
84.12% respectively (Asworo, 2015). Stock prices 
of PT Polaris Investama Tbk. recorded a staggering 
decline with almost 88% in 2017, and PT Capitol 
Nusantara Indonesia Tbk. with an 80% decline at 
the same year (How money indonesia, 2017). 
This study contributes to the growing evident 
of stock price crash risk that have been documented 
worldwide. Results from developing markets such 
as Indonesia add to our understanding on how the 
market participants make use of publicly available 
information in comparison with those from 
developed capital markets. This study is built upon 
a premise that firms with lower financial report 
qualities are more likely to experience stock price 
crashes. In light of the evident found in this study, 
it is interesting to note that investors seem to 
overlook the merit of financial report transparency 
when making equity investment decision. In 
addition, the results suggest that investors should 
consider institutional investor stability, audit 
tenure, and accounting conservatism when 
assessing return on investment. This study also 
provides additional support of bad news hoardings 
argument that has been widely used to link financial 
reporting quality and stock price crash risk.    
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
development 
Habib, Hasan, & Jiang (2017) state that agency 
theoretical framework underpin the bulk of 
empirical research on the determinants of stock 
price crash risk. Referring to Jin & Myers (2006), 
they argue that information asymmetries between 
corporate insiders and external stakeholders 
contribute to stock crash risk. Following agency 
theory framework, information asymmetries 
between managers and stockholders would result in 
opportunistic behavior on the part of managers. 
Information asymmetry produces agency conflicts. 
Having more access to all financial and operational 
information and full knowledge of firm’s prospect 
relative to outside parties has put managers in a 
better position to exploit the information for 
personal gain. Knowing that bad news will have a 
negative impact on the firm value, managers are 
more likely to withhold and hide the information 
from the market. The ability to withhold and hide 
information cannot go for a long period of time. As 
time elapses, accumulation of bad news has passed 
a certain threshold and must be released at once. 
When the market is aware of the accumulated bad 
news and responds negatively, the stock price 
should fall and stock price crash risk increases 
(Hutton et al., 2009; Kothari et al., 2009). 
 
Financial report transparency and stock price 
crashes 
Most prior studies on stock price crash risk 
have been built upon the concept of bad news 
hoarding proposed by Jin & Myers, 2006 
Conceptually, stock price crashes reflect the 
inability of managers to hide bad news that has 
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accumulated over time (Habib et al., 2017). When 
bad news accumulation has been so large and can 
no longer be kept from the markets, firms will have 
to release them at once. The sudden revelation of 
bad news result in a negative skewed return 
distribution (Hutton et al., 2009; Zhu, 2016). 
Specifically, Jin & Myers (2006) argue that less 
transparent firms will regularly attempt to withhold 
bad news as they come along periodically. But the 
ability of managers to hide bad news has a limit. 
When the accumulated bad news passes a certain 
threshold, no strategies left to escape from the 
markets’attention, and firms will have to release 
them immediately. Following the release, the 
markets will react negatively causing stock prices 
to crash. 
Prior studies documented a great deal of 
evidence in support of the bad news hoarding 
argument. Using earnings management as a proxy 
for financial report transparency, Hutton et al. 
(2009) show that transparent firms are less likely to 
experience stock price crash in the future. Kim et 
al., (2011) examine the relationship between CFO 
incentives and stock price crash risk. They find that 
CFO incentive is positively related to stock price 
crash risk. The findings indicate that the sensitivity 
of portfolio option value to stock prices encourage 
CFOs to hide bad news. Consistent results were 
also reported in (Benmelech, Kandel, & Veronesi, 
2010). Other study finds that weaknesses in internal 
control and frequency of management forecasts are 
significantly associated with stock price crash risk 
(Kim, Yeung, & Zhou, 2017). 
A lack of reporting transparency hinders 
investors to make an informed decision on  firm’s 
prospect. Jin & Myers (2006) point out that a lack 
of transparency is perceived as a manager’s covert 
effort to capture a portion of cash flow, and manage 
to hide it from investors. Limiting the amount of 
information available for investors causes 
disproportionate risk sharing between managers 
and investors. Investors would not be able to fully 
discern the changes in the firm's cash flow unless 
adequate firm-specific information is availbale for 
external users.  
Opportunistic managers intentionally confine 
the amount of information disclosed to outsiders 
and tend to exploit the information advantage to 
their best interest. For instance, when the actual 
firm's cash flow is higher than what investors 
expected, managers are motivated to take a larger 
portion of the cash flow. They will then deliberately 
reduce the amount of information available to 
outside parties to cover up the expropriation. But 
Jin & Myers (2006) argue that the amount of bad 
news a manager is willing to absorb is not 
unlimited. When a certain threshold passes, 
managers have no other option but to reveal all the 
bad news at once. Jin & Myers (2006) examine the 
effect of reporting transparency on stock price crash 
risk in various capital markets world wide. They 
find that less transparent firms are more likely to 
experience stock price crashes. 
In general, the concepts of transparency 
developed in Jin & Myers (2006) apply to all types 
of information. A more specific concept pertaining 
to financial statements is developed in 
(Kirschenheither & Melumad, 2002). It is assumed 
that operating cash flows consist of transitory and 
permanent components. Transitory components 
occur only in the current year while permanent 
components recur for several years. 
Kirschenheither & Melumad (2002) argue that 
firms with higher reported earnings enjoy 
increasing stock prices because investors perceive 
the higher earnings contain permanent cash flow. 
 When reported earnings is higher than 
expected, investors perceive it as bad news for the 
quality of reported earnings is in question. As a 
consequence, investors revise their belief in a firm 
future  prospect, causing firm value to decrease. On 
the other hand, the market considers reported 
earnings to be of high quality if the reported 
earnings matches market expected earnings. Being 
aware of the negative consequences of failing to 
meet market-expected earnings, managers are 
compelled to report earnings that are close to 
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market expectations. Similarly, Hutton et al., 
(2009) argue that opaque financial reports contain 
less firm-specific information and only a small 
portion of that information affects firm values. 
Stock return of less transparent firms are less 
volatile than market-wide variation because 
managers are willing to absorb temporary bad 
news.  
The association between financial reports 
transparency and stock price crash risk is stated in 
the following hypothesis: 
H1: Financial report transparency is negatively 
associated with stock price crash risk. 
 
Institutional ownership stability 
While institutional investors play a significant 
role in corporate decisions and stock price behavior 
(An & Zhang, 2013), concentrated ownership may 
alter the monitoring role of institutional investors 
(Hamdani & Yafeh, 2013). In the presence of 
dominant shareholders, the ability of institutional 
investors to exercise their voting rights to discipline 
managers is limited. The potential conflicts are now 
shifted to controlling and minority shareholders. 
Using a sample of life insurance firms in Israel, 
Hamdani & Yafeh (2013) find that institutional 
investors rarely use their voting rights against 
insider-sponsored proposals even when the law 
empowers the minority. Instead, they use their 
voting rights more often against compensation-
related proposals when minority shareholders do 
not influence outcomes. They conclude that 
empowering minority shareholders without 
addressing conflicts of interests is ineffective.  
In the context of institutional ownership in 
Indonesia, Wardhana & Tandelilin (2011) states 
that the majority of stockholders in Indonesia are 
institutional investors with an average portion of 
60% of the ownership. They investigate the role of 
institutional investors on firm performance as 
measured by asset utility and Tobin’s Q. Note that 
their study focuses on potential expropriation of a 
firm’s resources by controlling shareholders at the 
expense of minority shareholders. They show that 
the monitoring role of controlling institutional 
investors is at best when they own a significant 
number of shares.  
In addition to concentrated ownership, 
monitoring effectiveness of institutional investors 
is also contingent on its stability (X. Chen, Harford, 
& Li, 2007; Gaspar, Massa, & Matos, 2005; Koh, 
2007). Chen et al., (2007) show that long-term 
institutional investors with concentrated holdings 
are more willing and  motivated to monitor 
managers and thus mitigating agency problems. 
They argue that more stable institutional investors 
have informational advantage over other investors 
and are more determined to influence a firm’s 
strategic decision and future cash flow.  
Elyasiani, Jia, & Mao (2010)  find that stable 
institutional investors have more motivation and 
capability to exercise monitoring function 
effectively. Koh (2007) finds that stable 
institutional investors restrict aggressive earnings 
management. Taken together, these prior studies 
suggest that institutional investor stability may 
lower the propensity of managers to hide bad news 
from the market and decrease the likelihood of 
stock price crashes.   
However, Callen & Fang (2013)argue and find 
that stable institutional investors do not function 
effectively in disciplining managers when the focus 
is on short-term results. Effective monitoring can 
only be expected from institutional investors when 
they act as monitors. If institutional investors only 
care about short-term results, they tend to 
undermine monitoring efforts leading to increasing 
dysfunctional behavior of managers. Specifically, 
Callen & Fang (2013) call institutional investors 
with short-term perspective as short-termism. 
When institutional investors rely on current 
performance, less control induces managers to 
exploit company resources for personal gain 
(Gaspar et al., 2005). Yan & Zhang (2009) find that 
short-term-institutional investors are more active in 
trading stocks by exploiting informational 
advantage against other investors. In sum, when a 
manager’s opportunistic behavior is present, stable 
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institutional investors with short-term interest 
should increase future price crash risk for letting 
bad news hoarding undetected.     
Since the effect of stable institutional investors 
on stock price crashes cannot be clearly depicted, 
the following hypothesis is stated with no direction: 
H2: Institutional investor stability is associated with 
stock price crashes 
 
Audit tenure 
A regulation released by Indonesian Ministry 
of Finance (PMK) No. 17 / PMK.01 / 2008 
concerning Public Accountant Services dated 5 
February 2008, Article 3 paragraph (1) stipulated 
that: provision of general audit services for 
financial statements by accounting firms are 6 (six) 
consecutive years maximum and 3 (three) 
consecutive years for Auditors. The regulation was 
later changed under PP 20/2015, which states that 
the provision of public accounting services by 
accounting firms has no limit. In addition, auditor 
tenure is extended up to 5 consecutive years. 
Prior studies on audit tenure have found mixed 
results (Ghosh & Moon, 2005; Louwers, 1998; 
Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2003; Stanley & DeZoort, 
2007). In sum, long audit tenure increases audit 
quality which is reflected in the going-concern 
opinion given by auditors (Louwers, 1998). Audit 
tenure has a positive association with earnings 
response coefficient (Ghosh & Moon, 2005). Audit 
tenure is negatively associated with the incidence 
of restatement, suggesting that longer audit tenure 
improves audit quality (Stanley & DeZoort, 2007). 
On the other hand, Fortin & Pittman (2007) failed 
to identify the  relationship between long audit 
tenure and cost of debt. 
Collectively, these prior studies suggest that 
auditor knowledge of business environments is 
very helpful in detecting and preventing bad news 
hoarding. In early years of assignment, auditors 
may spend a lot of time and effort to learn the 
potential channels to hide the bad news (Callen & 
Fang, 2017). But over time, auditors have a deeper 
understanding of a client's business and financial 
reporting issues and become knowledgeable of 
potential errors which require special attention  
(Johnson et al. 2002; Beck & Wu, 2006) Thus, 
auditors with long audit tenure are expected to have 
the ability to prevent bad news hoardings and lower 
the price crash risks. 
On the other hand, Carey & Simnett (2006) 
find that long audit tenure reduces audit quality as 
reflected in going concern opinions. Similarly, 
Davis, Soo, & Trompeter (2009) find that longer 
auditor tenure is associated with higher earnings 
managements. Callen & Fang (2017) argue that 
long relationships between auditors and clients may 
reduce auditor independence, leading to similar 
interest between clients and accounting firms. In 
such a situation, it is less likely to expect the auditor 
to do his professional skepticism and impartiality 
during audit engagement. As audit tenure increases, 
auditors are more likely to submit to client pressure, 
especially towards the use of inappropriate 
accounting choices that fail to reflect a client’s 
economic reality, making accumulation of bad 
news hoardings go undetected. Less independent 
auditors provide a great opportunity for firms to 
conceal negative information from the market 
leading to higher price crash risk. 
Since the arguments for and against longer 
audit tenure are equally reasonable, the following 
hypothesis is stated with no direction. 




Conservatism is an accounting concept of 
recognizing bad news faster than good news. 
Application of the concept would result in 
asymmetric timeliness for gains and losses (Basu, 
1997). Givoly, Hayn, & Natarajan  
(2007) define conservative reporting as recognizing 
promptly an unfavorable outcome and deferring 
recognition of expected favorable events. 
Conservative accounting emerges to mitigate the 
negative effect of information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders (LaFond & Watts, 
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2008). Although conservative accounting would 
result in asset under-statement, it is a natural 
mechanism to prevent managers from overstating 
earnings to meet contract requirements (Watts, 
2003). 
Kothari et al., (2009) provide empirical 
evidence of a manager’s inclination toward 
releasing bad news slower than good news. Since 
accounting conservatism reduces the amount of bad 
news, then stock price crash risk can be reduced. 
Kim & Zhang (2014) find that stock price crash is 
more likely to occur when firms frequently 
withhold bad news from investors. Conservatism 
can also reduce the possibility of price crashes 
because it improves decision-making quality. 
Recognizing losses faster than gains are early 
warning mechanism that allows stockholders and 
board of directors to identify unfavorable projects 
and forcing managers to stop them (Ball & 
Shivakumar, 2005; J -B Kim & Zhang, 2014).  
Based on the above arguments, the relationship 
between conservatism and stock price crash risk 
can be stated in the following hypothesis: 
H4: Conservatism is negatively associated with 
stock price crash risk. 
 
3. Research method  
The firm samples were collected from 
Indonesia Stock Exchange official website and 
other sources on the internet. To be included in the 
sample, firms must have listed for five consecutive 
years from 2011 to 2015 and disclosed complete 
data to measure variables. The sample firms are 
restricted to this particular period because a number 
of firms had experienced a large decrease in stock 
prices during this period. Five consecutive years 
restriction is imposed for the purpose of measuring 
institutional investor stability variable. This study 
uses standard deviation of institutional ownership 
as proxy for institutional investor stability. 
Calculating standard deviation of institutional 
ownership requires firms to have five consecutive 
annual reports. 
The financial data are primarily gathered from 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. When annual reports 
are not available in Indonesia Stock Exchange 
official website, additional search was carried out 
with Google search engine or looking through 
company official website. A firm will be excluded 
from sample if no financial statements available 
from the data sources. Information on stock prices 
are collected from yahoo finance. As much as 1065 
firm observations were collected during the period 
of study.  
 
Measure of variables   
Stock price crash risk 
Stock price crash is widely defined as large 
drop in stock prices for a period of time (Zhu, 
2016).  Specifically, stock price crash risk is related 
to negative skewness in the distribution of returns 
for individual stocks (Chen, Hong, & Stein, 2001; 
Habib et al., 2017; Kim & Zhang, 2014). The initial 
step to measure price crash risk is to obtain 
residuals from expanded market model (Andreou et 
al., 2016; J -B Kim & Zhang, 2014). Unlike the 
original market model, two-week lead and lag of 
market index are included in the expanded market 
model. Two weeks lead and lag are included in the 
market model to anticipate non-synchronous 
trading suggested in (Dimson, 1979). The residuals 
obtained from expanded market model reflect firm-
specific information.  
 
 
Rjt = αj + β1Rm,t-2 + β2 Rm,t-1 + β3 Rm,t + β4 Rm,t+1 + β5 Rm,t+2 + εj,t  (1)
Where rj,t is the return for firm j week t and rm,t is 
the return on JCI in week t. 
 Following Andreou et al., (2016) the 
residuals from the expanded market model (εj,t) are 
added by 1 and transformed into natural logarithms 
(wj,t = ln (1 + ej, t). Transformed residuals (wj,t) 
reflect all information related to firm-specific 
information and are used as input to compute price 
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crash risk. Note that the residuals are converted into 
a natural logarithmic to mitigate the tendency for 
positive return distribution to skew and to maintain 
a symmetrical return distribution. 
More specifically, this study uses two 
measures of price crash risk. The first measure of 
price crash risk is the absolute value of the 
difference between the minimum of weekly return 
(Wjt) and its mean, divided by its standard deviation 
(Zhu, 2016). The second measure of price crash risk 
is the negative conditional return skewness 
(NCSKEW) introduced by (Kim et al., 2011). 
NCSKEW is computed by taking the negative of 
the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns 
for each sample year and dividing it by the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns and then 
raising to the third power. In this study, the second 
measure of price crash risk suggested by Kim et al., 
(2011) is used as a robustness check. Specifically, 







3/2]   (2) 
 
Where w3j,t is a firm-specific weekly return 
raised to the third power. The measure is multiplied 
by minus (–) for ease of interpretation. The higher 
value reflects greater price crashes risk. 
 
Transparency of financial statements 
Several transparency measures have been 
introduced in accounting literature. One alternative 
measure is to use factor analysis to isolate two 
distinct factors from a range of measures capturing 
countries’ firm-specific information environments 
(Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004). Another 
alternative measure of transparency is reported in 
Zhong  (2018) where six firm level-measures were 
used to capture three key aspects of transparency: 
financial reporting quality, the use of global 
accounting standards, and the quality of the 
external information environment. In addition, 
Hutton et al., (2009) employ a simple but intuitive 
measure of transparency using three-year moving 
sum of the absolute value of annual discretionary 
accruals. Due to its simplicity, this study follows 
Hutton et al., (2009) model to measure financial 
report transparency.  
Hutton et al., (2009) argue that firms attempt to 
delay or hide bad news are reflected in the 
discretionary accruals. The longer a company 
delays bad news from the market, the greater is 
discretionary accruals. Firms with higher value of 
discretionary accruals are more opaque than those 
of lower value. However, for ease of interpretation 
and to maintain consistency with hypothesis one, 
absolute value of three years accumulated 
discretionary accruals is multiplied by -1. Thus, 
higher value reflects higher transparency. 
Specifically, financial statement transparency is 
calculated by the following equation: 
 
 
Transp = Abs (DiscAccrt-1 + DiscAccrt-2+ DiscAccrt-3)              (3) 
 
According to Hutton et al., (2009), firms 
generally manipulate earnings from one to three 
years before being detected. They argue that firms 
with large absolute value of discretionary accruals 
will tend to manage earnings and try to hide it by 
providing less-firm-specific information to 
investors. Therefore, earnings management that 
lasts several years is better captured by using a 
three-year sum of absolute value of discretionary 
accruals. Meanwhile, the model specification to 
estimate discretionary accruals (DiscAccr) follows 
(Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005). The model is 
stated as follows: 
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            ACCRj,t//TAj,t-1 = β0 + β1(SALEj,t/TAi,t-1) + β2 (PPEj,t/TAj,t-1) + β3 (ROAj,t/TAj,t-1)   (4) 
 
Where ACCRi,t denotes total accrual for firm j 
in year t measured as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations and cash flows, TA j,t-1 is 
the total asset for firm j in year t-1, SALEj,t is a 
change in sales for firm j in year t, PPEj,t denotes 
property, plant and equipment for firm j in year t, 
and ROAjt is the ratio of earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations for 
firm j in year t to total assets. The model is 
estimated cross-sectionally for for each industry 
based on Jakarta Stock Industrial Classification 
(JASICA) which was released by Indonesian Stock 
Exchange. Discretionary accruals are the residual 
value of the estimation model. The residual from 
the model is a measure of DiscAccr. 
 
Institutional investor stability  
A measure of institutional investor stability follows 
Elyasiani et al., (2010) and Callen & Fang (2013) 
More specifically, institutional investor stability is 
defined as the average standard deviation of 
institutional ownership over a five-year period 
including sample period and four preceding years. 
Following is the procedure to calculate institutional 
investor stability. First, get the standard deviation 
of institutional ownership of a firm for a particular 
year. For instance, a company has four different 
institutional investor with different ownership. 
Calculate the standard deviation of the institutional 
ownership.  Second, add the standard deviation of 
institutional ownership of that particular company 
for a five-year period and divide it by five. 




Where (𝑝) is the proportion of firm i held by 
investor j at year t and N is the number of 
institutional investors in the firm j. The higher the 
Inst, the less stable is the institutional investors in a 
particular firm.  
 
Audit Tenure 
Audit tenure is defined as the number of years 
audit firm has been involved in audit engagement 
for one client. Prior to 2015, the maximum audit 
tenure for an Indonesian accounting firm was six 
years. But starting from 2015 onward, the 
restriction is relaxed and accounting firms is 




At present, there are at least five alternatives 
measures of conservatism proposed in the 
accounting literature (Wang, Hogartaigh, & Zijl, 
2009). These measures include: 1) Basu's (1997) 
asymmetric timeliness measure 2) Ball & 
Shivakumar's (2005) asymmetric cash flow to 
accruals measure. 3) Market to book ratio based on 
Feltham & Ohlson's (1995) analytical study. 4) 
Penman & Zhang (2002) hidden-reserve measure. 
5) Givoly & Hayn's (2000) negative accruals 
measure. 
Each measure has its own weakness. For 
example, Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness 
measure is criticized due to inconsistent results 
found in various studies using the same measure. 
Asymmetric timeliness and asymmetric cash flow 
model of (Ball & Shivakumar (2005) basically 
contain the same weakness as  Basu's (1997) for 
conservatism is estimated using similar procedure. 
Market to book value of equity measure is criticized 
because economic rents are generally not 
recognized in the book value of equity. Although 
conservative financial reporting is being adopted by 
a firm, the existence of economics rents will always 
cause book value to be less than market value 
(Roychowdhury & Watts, 2007). The negative 
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researchers to accumulate accruals for several 
periods starting from a base year. Problems arise 
when determining the base year. Different sample 
periods require different base year, making 
generalization difficult to attain. In addition, 
negative accruals ignore depreciation. Finally, 
measure of conservatism using hidden reserves has 
its difficulty in collecting research and 
development expenditures data. 
Considering the weaknesses inherent in five 
measures of accounting conservatism, this study 
employs Market to Book value ratio (MTB) as a 
proxy for conservatism because it has strong 
theoretical basis. As described, the measure is 
derived from analytical study of (Feltham & 
Ohlson, 1995). They argue that application of 
accounting conservatism suppresses book value of 
equity downward relative to its market value. As a 
result, the use of conservative accounting will tend 
to reduce book value of equity. Higher value of 
MTB ratio indicates higher application of 
conservative accounting in financial reporting. 
Another advantage of MTB as a proxy for 
conservatism is the ease of computation. Study 
conducted by Wang et al. (2009) revealed that MTB 
is one of the most popular measure of conservatism 




𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦   
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
    (6)
 
Control variables 
Control variables are included in the test of 
hypothesis to reduce the effect of extraneous 
variables on stock price crash risk. The four control 
variables are firm size, profitability, leverage, and 
sales growth. These control variables were reported 
to have an effect on stock price crash risk (Chen et 
al., 2001; Hutton et al., 2009; Jin & Myers, 2006). 
Firm size is measured using a natural logarithm of 
total asset and profitability is the ratio of net income 
to total assets. Sales growth is current sales minus 
last year sale, divided by current sale and leverage 
is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 
Model specifications 
The following model is employed to test the 
hypothesis. 
 
Crashesjt = β0 + β1Transpjt+ β2Instjt + β3Tenurjt + β4 Conserjt + β5 Sizejt + β6Growthjt 
+ β7ROAjt + β8LEVjt εjt          (7) 
 
Where: 
- Crashes = Stock price crash risk 
- Transp = Transparency of financial 
statements 
- Inst = Stability of institutional ownership 
- Tenure = audit engagement period 
- Conser = Conservatism 
- Size = firm size 
- Growth = Sales growth 
- ROA = Profitability. 
- LEV = leverage 
 
Hypothesis one (H1) predicts that 
transparency is negatively associated with stock 
price crash risk. If coefficient β1 is negative and 
significant at less 5%, then it is concluded that H1 
is statistically supported. Hypothesis two (H2) 
predicts that institutional investors’ stability is 
associated with stock price crash risk. H2 is 
statistically supported if coefficient β2 is either 
negative or positive and significant at less than 
5%. Hypothesis three (H3) predicts that audit 
tenure is associated with stock price crash risk. H3 
is statistically supported if coefficient β3 is either 
negative or positive and significant at less than 
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5%. Hypothesis four (H4) predicts that 
conservatism is negatively associated with stock 
price crash risk. If coefficient β4 is negative and 
significant at less than 5%, then it is concluded that 
H4 is statistically supported. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Descriptive statistics 
As described in the previous section, the 
number of observations available for hypothesis 
testing is 1,065 firm-year observations. However, 
as much as 276 observations are eliminated 
because of falling outside three standard 
deviations from its mean. Extreme values might 
adversely affect the validity of results. The 
elimination process results in a final sample of 748 
firm-year observations. Table 2 reports descriptive 
statistics for all variables. 
As shown in Table 1, the mean of 2,614 for 
stock price crash suggests that the magnitude of 
the worst weekly return is 2.614 times the standard 
deviation below the mean. The figure is close to 
(Zhu, 2016). As for financial reporting 
transparency (TRANSP), the mean value is 0.151. 
Note that the proxy for financial reporting 
transparency is the absolute value of three-years 
discretionary accruals.  
The greater the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals, the less transparent a firm’s financial 
reporting. Financial reporting is considered to be 
transparent if the number of absolute accruals 
discretionary is close to zero. Accordingly, sample 
firms have less transparent financial reporting. 
Institutional investors stability (INST) tends to be 
stable over time as reflected by a mean of 0.049. 
As described earlier, institutional investor stability 
is measured by taking the average of standard 
deviation of the institutional ownership for a 
minimum of three years. The higher values reflect 
unstable institutional investors.  
Audit tenure (TENUR) has a mean of 3.13 
years and the mean for conservatism (CONSER) 
is 1.447. Note that conservatism is measured by 
comparing market value of equity and book value 
of equity. Hence, market value of firm-samples is 
44.7% higher than book value of equity, 
suggesting that firm-samples use more 
conservative accounting policies. Descriptive 
statistics for control variables show considerable 
differences in firms’ characteristics. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Minimum P75 Maximum 
CRASHES 2.614 2.52 0.04 3.100 5.100 
TRANSP 0.151 0.11 0.01 0.19 2.09 
INST 0.049 0.018 0.00 0.064 0.404 
TENUR 3.13 3.000 1.00 5.00 7.00 
CONSER 1.447 1.035 -4.193 2.043 9.820 
SIZE 7.649 7.596 1.099 8.933 12.411 
GROWTH 0.189 0.106 -1.000 0.234 8.727 
ROA 0.056 0.040 -1.082 0.086 0.846 
LEV 0.478 0.452 0.000 0.616 3.615 
 
Correlation matrix 
Table 2 presents correlation coefficients for 
all variables. The focus is on the association 
between stock price crash risk and independent 
variables depicted in research hypotheses. 
Contrary to the prediction, the correlation between 
financial statement transparency and stock price 
crash risk is positive (0.004) and statistically 
insignificant (two-tailed). Institutional investor 
stability and stock price crash risk are negatively 
related (-0.072) at 5% level (two-tailed). This is 
consistent with prediction. Audit tenure and stock 
price crash risk are positively related at 5% level 
and consistent with prediction. Note, however, 
that correlation between audit tenure and stock 
price crash risk is hypothesized with no direction. 
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As for conservatism and stock price crash risk, 
both are negatively related (-0,100) at 1% level 
and consistent with prediction. Overall, the results 
presented in Table 2 provide preliminary evidence 
to support H2 and H4 but not for H1 and H3. 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix 
  CRASHES TRANSP INST TENUR KONSER SIZE GROWTH ROA LEV 
CRASHES 1         
TRANSP 0.004 1        
INST -0.072* 0.042 1       
TENUR 0.077* -0.013 -0.062 1      
KONSER -0.100** 0.003 -0.005 0.050 1     
SIZE -0.094* 0.076* -0.063 0.106** 0.199** 1    
GROWTH -0.128** -0.062 0.021 -0.015 0.118** -0.024 1   
ROA -0.069 -0.046 0.003 0.049 0.113** 0.026 0.087* 1  
LEV 0.085* -0.017 -0.062 0.000 -0.075* 0.039 -0.053 -0.009 1 
*Significant level at 0.05; **Significant level at 0.01     
Multiple regressions results    
Table 3 reports the test of hypotheses results. 
Following Kim et al. (2017), year dummies are 
included in the regression model to control for 
time-variant that could potentially change 
regression coefficients over time. The results show 
that while audit tenure and institutional investor 
stability are significantly associated with stock 
price crash risk at 1% and 5% level respectively, 
no significant association between transparency 
and stock price crash risk. On the other hand, 
conservatism has weak association with stock 
price crash risk (significant at less than 10%). 
Taken as a whole, the results reported in Table 3 
support  H2 and H4 and reject H1 and H3. All 
control variables, except for ROA, are associated 
with stock price crash risk. While leverage is 
significantly associated with stock price crashes, 
the direction is not consistent with prediction. The 
significant effect of control variables on stock 
price crash risk suggests that the inclusion of these 
variables are justifiable.  
 
Table 3. Regression results 
Variables Expected Signs Coefficients P-value 
TRANSP - -0.073 0.488 
INST - -0.657 0.049 
TENUR + 0.049 0.003 
KONSER - -0.034 0.060 
SIZE +/- -0.053 0.001 
GROWTH - -0.130 0.003 
ROA - -0.257 0.137 
LEV - 0.161 0.034 
N 748   
Year dummies Included   
 
 
Hypothesis one predicts that transparency of 
financial reporting is significantly associated with 
stock price crash risk. But the evidence is not 
consistent with the prediction. It also contradicts 
the evidence reported in Hutton et al., (2009) and 
Kim & Zhang (2014). As described before, this 
study follows Hutton et al., (2009) of 
transparency. They argue that earnings 
management can last for multiple years and three 
years of accumulated discretionary accruals may 
capture years of earnings management activities. 
This study adopts the assumption and uses the sum 
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of three-year discretionary accruals to capture 
earnings management. However, the findings of 
this present study suggest that the assumption may 
not hold in Indonesian context due to different 
culture and business practices. The measure of 
transparency employed by (Hutton et al., 2009) 
appears to be unable to capture earnings 
management activities among Indonesian firms. 
Thus, the results of this study should be interpreted 
cautiously.  
An alternative explanation is that investors in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange seem to be largely 
dependent on market-specific information rather 
than firm-specific information. The lack of belief 
in firm-specific information urges them to seek 
other types of information to make equity 
investment decisions. Conceptually, financial 
reports should be an indicative of future prospects 
and useful in assessing potential gains or losses 
from equity investment. However, the benefit of 
financial statements in making investment 
decisions depends on investor’s belief in the 
credibility of financial reporting. In light of these 
findings, capital market authorities must take 
necessary steps to increase investor confidence in 
financial reports. One way is to issue regulations 
that effectively increase the monitoring process of 
financial reporting disclosure.      
Subsequent research should consider the use 
of annual discretionary accruals as a measure of 
transparency instead of three-year accumulated 
discretionary accruals. In Kim & Zhang's study 
(2014) four different transparency measures are 
employed. The first measure is similar to Hutton 
et al., (2009), The second measure is financial 
restatement. The third and fourth use irregularity 
and error in financial statements as proxies for 
transparency.They report that three of four 
measures are significantly related to stock price 
crash risk.  
Hypothesis two predicts that institutional 
investor stability is associated with stock price 
crash risk. Note again that this study employs 
deviation standard of institutional ownership as a 
proxy for institutional investor stability. Higher 
scores suggest unstable institutional investors. 
Accordingly, a negative correlation presented in 
table 3 indicates that the likelihood of stock price 
crashes increases with stable institutional 
investors. In light of two opposing views 
introduced earlier, the findings are consistent with 
a view that institutional investors in Indonesia are 
more short-termism than monitors. Institutional 
investors with short-term perspective tend to 
overlook monitoring functions causing bad news 
hoardings to go undetected. As previously 
described, stable institutional investors with long 
investment horizon have significant influence on 
the decision to allocate resources and set business 
strategies.  
However, when stable institutional investors 
with concentrated holdings merely focus on short-
term results, they are unable to curb dysfunctional 
behavior of managers leading to increased 
propensity of stock price crash risk. A negative 
correlation between the two variables reported in 
this study is inconsistent with evidence 
documented in Callen & Fang (2013) in which 
they examine the role of institutional investors in 
mitigating stock price crash risk by using two 
different measures of institutional investor 
stability. The first measure is standard deviation of 
institutional ownership as used in this study. The 
second is the percentage of shares owned by 
dedicated investors relative to the number of 
outstanding shares, and the third is the percentage 
of shares owned by institutional investors with 
short-term insight (institutional transient 
investors). Using deviation standard of 
institutional ownership as a proxy for institutional 
investor stability, they find that institutional 
investor stability is positively associated with 
stock price crash risk.  
Hypothesis three states that audit tenure is 
associated with stock price crash risk. Note that 
the previous section describes the association 
between the two variables cannot be stated 
convincingly in a particular direction, and thus H3 
72 
Butar Butar & Murniati/Jurnal Dinamika Akuntansi dan Bisnis Vol. 8(1), 2021 pp 59-76 
 
is stated with no specific direction. A positive 
relationship between audit tenure and stock price 
crashes reported in Table 3 indicates that auditors 
with long audit engagement are more likely to 
overlook bad news hoarding activities which lead 
to higher stock price crash risk in the future. A 
long relationship between the auditor and the 
client causes the auditor to become reckless and 
tend to overlook bias contained in financial 
reports. The knowledge and experience of auditors 
from long audit engagements are supposedly 
enabling them to detect potential misuse of a 
firm’s resource. But this is not the case. It appears 
that long audit tenure causes auditors to fail to 
exercise their professional judgment diligently. 
Lack of professional skepticism stemming from 
personal attachment toward a client ultimately 
erodes the ability of auditors to detect and prevent 
bad news hoarding activities and increases the 
likelihood of stock price crashes. In light of the 
audit tenure regulation in Indonesia that took place 
in 2005, the results of this study suggest that the 
regulation fails to achieve its purpose. By relaxing 
audit tenure restrictions, auditors seem to lose 
independence and competence which leads to 
higher propensity of stock price crashes.       
The positive association between audit tenure 
and stock price crash risk also contradicts with 
evidence reported in Callen & Fang (2017). In 
their study, three alternative proxies for stock price 
crash were employed. Using three different 
measures of stock price crashes, they find that 
audit tenure is negatively related to stock price 
crash. 
Hypothesis four predicts less conservative 
firms are more prone to stock price crashes. 
Although the correlation is weak (at 10% level), 
the results reported in Table 3 appear to be 
consistent with the prediction. The negative 
relationship between conservatism and stock price 
crash risk indicates that conservative accounting 
practices prevent bad news accumulation and 
reduces price crash risk. The result is consistent 
with Kim & Zhang (2016) where they find that the 
relationship between conservatism and stock price 
crashes is stronger in companies with high 
asymmetry information. As widely described in 
accounting literature, principal-based standard 
advocated by the accounting profession is heavily 
reliant on manager’s discretions that may induce 
aggressive financial reporting practice. 
Aggressive accounting policies provide more 
opportunities for managers to hide bad news which 
leads to higher propensity of stock price crash. 
Thus, the findings seem to contradict with the goal 
of accounting profession to embrace fair market 
value as a major valuation method to be applied in 
preparing financial statements.     
 
Sensitivity test 
The test results reported in Table 3 measure 
stock price crash risk as an absolute value of the 
difference between the minimum of weekly return 
and its mean, divided by its standard deviation. 
Additional test is carried out using an alternative 
measure of stock price crash risk to assess the 
robustness of the results. The second proxy for 
stock price crashes, as previously described, is 
adopted from Kim et al., (2011) by taking firm-
specific negative of the third moment weekly 
returns for each sample year and dividing it by the 
standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns. 
The results are reported in Table 4. 
As presented in Table 4, two of four  
hypotheses are supported and qualitatively 
consistent with the previous results reported in 
Table 3. Institutional investor stability and audit 
tenure have significant effects on stock price 
crashes at 1% and 5% respectively. As before, 
audit tenure and stock price crashes are positively 
associated. The weak association between 
conservatism and stock price crash risk (at 10% 
level of significant) is also observed. On the other 
hand, no significant correlation is detected for 
transparency and stock price crash risk. Overall, 
employing two different measures of stock price 
crash generally produces consistent results. 
73 




Table 4. Sensitivity test results 
Variables Expected Signs Coefficients P-value 
TRANSP - -0.041 0.442 
INST - -1.369 0.009 
TENUR + 0.056 0.012 
KONSER - 0.001 0.487 
SIZE +/- 0.033 0.091 
GROWTH - -0.215 0.001 
ROA - -0.238 0.241 
LEV - 0.149 0.118 
N 748   
Year dummies Included   
 
5. Conclusions 
This study demonstrated that institutional 
investor stability, audit tenure, and conservatism 
have a significant effect on stock price crash risk, 
but financial report transparency has no effect on 
on stock price crash risk. Institutional investor 
stability is negatively associated with stock price 
crash risk. Future research in Indonesian capital 
market should consider different proxy for price 
crash risk such as negative slope coefficients 
(Callen & Fang, 2017), employ expanded market 
model of weekly return in measuring stock price 
crash risk. In addition, future studies should also 
consider different proxies for financial report 
transparency and institutional investor stability. 
Restatements and other irregularities can be 
alternative measures for transparency. The 
percentage of shares held by institutional investors 
with short-term insight can be used as a proxy for 
institutional ownership (Callen & Fang, 2013). 
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